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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JEFF MARMOR, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
PATRICIA MAR1\10R, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) j SUPREME COURT NO. 41062-2013 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, 
In and For the County of Ada 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge Presiding 
Counself for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Mr. Aaron J. Tribble ISB #8951 
Mr. David M. Fogg ISB #7610 
Eagle Law Center, LLC 
1191 E. Iron Eagle Dr. 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Counsel for Defendant-Respondent 
Mr. Matthew Bohn ISB #5967 
Cosho Humphrey, LLP 
800 Park Blvd 
Suite 790 
Boise, ID 83712 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In December 2004, Mr. Marmor and Mrs. Marmor purchased certain real property in 
Kuna, Idaho. CR. Vol. l p. 7, L. 22-24. In May 2009, the two of them received a divorce. CR. 
Vol. l p. 9, L. 1-3; CR. Vol. l p. 50-69. As part of that divorce, the wife received this marital 
property located at 304 E. Scops Owl Dr., Kuna, Idaho. CR. Vol. I, p. 56, L. 8-20. Under the 
terms of the decree, the wife was required to make "a good faith effort" to refinance the marital 
debt on the property within 180 days from the date of the divorce. However, the decree 
specifically ordered that Mr. Marmor's name remain on the title of the property until the 
refinance was completed. Id. 
After almost 4 years had elapsed, the wife had never refinanced the debt on the property. 
CR. Vol. l p. 8, L. 4-5. And Mr. Mannor's name was still on the title. CR. Vol. l p. 7, L. 5-7. 
Finally, Mr. Marmor brought the underlying action in order to enforce his rights as a titleholder of 
the property pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-501 et seq. CR. Vol. l p. 7, L. 8-1 O; CR. Vol. l p. 5. 
Without even filing an answer, Mrs. Marmor immediately filed for summary judgment 
claiming that the subject property was her sole and separate property and raised issues such as res 
judicata and lack of jurisdiction. CR. Vol. l p. 45-82. The District Court granted summary 
judgment, believing that the case would be best brought in family court for a failure to fulfill an 
obligation under the terms of the decree. Tr. Feb. 11, 2013, p. 33,L. 3-8. Mrs. Marmor timely 
filed a memorandum of costs and attorney fees, and Mr. Mannor timely filed a motion to disallow 
fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6). CR. Vol. l p. 115-121; CR. Vol. l p. 124-130. The District 
Court awarded attorney fees to Mrs. Marmor holding that the attorney fee clause of the divorce 
decree operated against Mr. Marmor in this action. In awarding attorney fees to Mrs. Marmor, 
the District Court entered the Judgment and Order for Attorney Fees and Costs on April 25, 
2013. CR. Vol. I, p. 140-141. 
More than 30 days after the entry of the Judgment and Order for Attorney Fees and Costs, 
Mrs. Marmor filed a Supplemental Memorandum for Attorney Fees and Costs seeking an award 
for attorney fees incurred in defense of the first motion to disallow. AR. Ex. K. Mr. Marmor 
timely filed another motion to disallow arguing that Mrs. Marmor's supplemental memorandum 
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was not filed within the 14-day limit proscribed by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). AR. Ex.Land M The 
District Court again awarded fees to Mrs. Marmor in its Memorandum Decision and Order 
Denying Plaintiff's Second Motion to Disallow Costs and subsequently entered Judgment. AR. Ex. 
Oand P. 
Mr. Mannor timely filed this appeal on June 3, 2013, within the 42-day limit proscribed 
by rule. CR. Vol. I, p. 142-147. After the District Comi made it's second award of fees, Mr. 
Mannor moved to augment the record with the new material. AR. Ex. A through P. The matter is 
now before this Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Under a divorce decree, which does not contain a term ordering partition of the marital 
residence, did the District Court err by holding that a partition request was an action to 
"enforce the terms" of the divorce decree and award attorney fees as a consequence? 
II. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)( 5), which mandates the filing of a 
memorandum of costs within 14 days after a decision and entry of judgment, did the 
District Comi err by awarding costs not timely filed within the 14 day limit? 
III. Under the terms of the decree and under Idaho law, is the Appellant entitled to an award 
of attorney fees on appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Marmor presents a two-layer argument. First, the District Court wrongly entered two 
awards of attorney fees against Mr. Marmor pursuant to his divorce decree. The divorce decree 
should never have been used against Mr. Marmor to make two awards of fees in the underlying 
action. If the Court chooses not to reverse these awards of fees based on misapplication of the 
divorce decree, then the Court should reverse the second award of fees. In the second award of 
fees, the District Court misinterpreted I.R.C.P. 54. This misinterpretation resulted in a judgment 
for fees that must also be reversed. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case comes before the Court as a matter involving contractual interpretation and 
interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Like statutes and rules of evidence, the rules 
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of civil procedure are reviewed de novo. See State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821 ( 1998); Gibson 
v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 757 (2006). Any statutory interpretation is also a question oflaw, 
and the Court exercises free review. BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Eng 'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 
719,726 (2008) (quoting Stout v. Key Training Corp., 144 Idaho 195, 196 (2007)). 
Concerning contracts, the Court exercises free review over the interpretation of clear and 
unambiguous contracts. City ofChubbuckv. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,201 (1994). 
Finally, when a District Court applies law to the facts in a case, that application oflaw is also 
reviewed de novo. Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 679 (2009). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN USING THE DIVORCE DECREE TO A WARD 
FEES IN THIS CASE 
The awards of attorney fees in this case were made pursuant to a divorce decree. The 
decree contained no terms concerning how to proceed in the event that a refinance of the marital 
residence could not be accomplished. But the decree did mandate that Mr. Marmor' s name stay 
on the title of the property. Despite this, the District Court awarded attorney fees as if the lawsuit 
concerned the enforcement of terms in the decree. The Appellant comes now before this Court 
requesting a reversal of these fee requests, which were both unfounded. 
A. The divorce decree is unambiguously awarded joint property rights to the 
Husband and Wife 
The parties' decree of divorce contains terms concerning the refinance of the marital 
residence, but is silent concerning what to do if a refinance cannot be accomplished. "The same 
rules of construction applicable to contracts and written documents in general apply to [the] 
interpretation of [a decree of divorce]." DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 65 (1986). 
"Interpretation of an unambiguous document presents a question of law." Suchan v. Suchan, 113 
Idaho 102, 106 (1986). "Further, the determination of whether a document is ambiguous is itself 
a question oflaw." Id. 
The intent of the parties should, if possible, be ascertained "from the language contained 
in their contract, and unless it contains absurdities or contradictions, the contract is the best 
evidence of the parties' intent." Id at 660. Also, where a contract is unambiguous, 
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"determination of its meaning and legal effect are questions of law to be decided by the court." Id 
at 660. Intention is determined by the plain meaning of the contractual language. Tapper v. 
Idaho Irr. Co., 36 Idaho 78 (1922). 
The divorce decree in this case was stipulated by the parties and contains an integration 
clause making it "the entire understanding of the parties." CR. Vol. I, p. 61. Outside this decree 
there are "no representations, promises, warranties, covenants, or undertakings." Id. The decree 
1mambiguously assigns property to the Respondent as follows: 
Wife shall be awarded the marital property located at 304 E. Scops Owl Dr., 
Kuna, Idaho. Wife will make a good faith effort to refinance the property 
within 180 days of the date of entry of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
in this matter at a comparable interest rate and/or payment amount. Wife 
will be responsible for all mortgage payments associated with this property. 
Husband's name shall remain on title until the refinance is complete. In the 
event Wife defaults on any mortgage payment she agrees she will cure the 
default within thirty (30) days or vacate premises. If the default is not cured 
the house will be placed on the market for sale by Husband and Wife. The 
parties shall co-operate fully in listing, showing, and signing any and all 
documents required to sell the property for any off er received at the then fair 
market value as determined by an independent appraiser. Wife will receive 
the entire proceeds from the sale minus costs and fees and maintenance fees 
paid by husband minus any rents received by husband prior to sale. 
CR. Vol. L p. 56, l. 8-20. 
So, the decree of divorce unambiguously awards this property to the Wife. Also, it 
unambiguously lays out a path for the refinance of the property within 180 days of the date of 
19 divorce. Moreover, it mandates that the property be sold if the Wife cannot keep the up with the 
20 payments on the jointly-held debt. 
21 However, the decree is conspicuously silent concerning what should happen if 180 days 
22 elapse without a refinance and the mortgage remains current. This is the situation that the parties 
23 found themselves in at the start of the underlying action. This is what caused the underlying 
24 action to be filed. 
25 Did the parties intend nothing to happen if a refinance was not accomplished within 180 
26 days? Did the parties intend to remain joint tenants indefinitely? Absolutely not! The decree 
27 unambiguously states that the Husband's name shall remain on the title of the property until the 
28 refinance is complete. 
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1 Why does the decree mandate that the Husband remain on title? The answer is obvious. 
2 Both parties entered into this stipulation with knowledge of applicable Idaho property law, 
3 including Idaho Code§ 6-501 et seq. 
4 The parties did not include a term in the decree explaining what would happen if a 
5 refinance didn't occur, because Idaho law automatically fills that gap. So, it was the parties' 
6 intent to allow the Husband the option to exercise his property rights under LC. § 6-501 et seq 
7 should a refinance be unsuccessful after 180 days. 
8 B. There is no term in the decree that is being enforced 
9 The attorney fee clause in the divorce decree cannot operate against Mr. Marmor in this 
10 action. The decree unambiguously awards attorney fees to a prevailing party in "any proceeding 
11 brought or defended ... to enforce the terms of this stipulation." CR. Vol. L p. 60, l. 20-25 
12 (emphasis added). 
13 Choosing to focus on the words "any proceeding", the District Court failed to analyze 
14 whether there were actually tenns in the decree that were being enforced. Tr. Apr. 22, 2013, p. 
15 11, l. 11-22. As shown in the previous subsection, the decree is actually silent on what should 
16 occur if a refinance in not accomplished after 180 days. However, the decree very clearly gives 
17 Mr. Marmor rights in the property, because it mandates that the Husband's name remain on the 
18 title. 
19 Mr. Marmor brought this suit seeking a partition sale of the subject property pursuant to 
20 Idaho law. CR. Vol. L p. 7, l. 8-9. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-508, Mr. Marmor also properly 
21 requested declaratory relief to clarify his rights to the property. CR. Vol. L p. 10, l. 21-26. 
22 Although Mr. Marmor did request a refinance, this request was done as an accommodation in the 
23 alternative of a full partition sale that he was entitled to under law. CR. Vol. L p. II, l. 3-8. 
24 Nowhere in the pleadings did Mr. Marmor request any relief pursuant to the terms of the 
25 divorce decree, and there are no terms in the decree that address the type of situation presented in 
26 the complaint's general factual allegations and background. CR. Vol. L p. 7-8. Relief was only 
27 available under Idaho law, not under the terms of the divorce decree. To be sure, this lawsuit was 
28 brought in District Court because District Court has jurisdiction over property rights. Mr. 
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Marmor, represented by competent counsel, could not have brought a suit in District Court 
seeking relief pursuant to a divorce decree, because such an issue is properly brought before a 
family court, not District Court. If it was Mr. Marmor's intent to enforce the terms of the divorce 
decree, he would have brought such action in family court. 
In Dist1ict Court, the Respondent constructed an elaborate strawman argument and was 
able to persuade their way to a dismissal. Putting words Mr. Marmor' s mouth, the Respondent 
argued that Mr. Mmmor was trying to enforce the divorce decree in District Court even though 
Mr. Mmmor's pleading clearly invoked Idaho Code§ 6-501 et seq. Of course, because the 
District Court believed in this fundamentally flawed strawrnan, it's easy to foresee that the 
Distiict Court would dismiss the case. 
The District Court, however, gave no explanation for how it chose to interpret the decree. 
The Respondent's interpretation is flawed because it gives absolutely no weight to the term that 
states "Husband's name shall remain on title until the refinance is complete." The Respondent's 
interpretation of clause 15.01 amounts to "Wife will make a good faith effort to refinance within 
180 days, or nothing happens." In contrast, Mr. Marrnor's interpretation is a better interpretation 
because it gives actual weight to the term "Husband's name shall remain on title." Mr. Marmor's 
interpretation is "Wife will make a good faith effort to refinance with 180 days, OR ELSE." In 
this case, the "OR ELSE" is the enforcement of property rights under Idaho Code§ 6-501. This 
interpretation is best because it gives weight to all the tenns in clause 15.01. 
To be sure, Mr. Marmor brought this action in District Court, because District Court is the 
proper venue to enforce property rights. The decree contains no tenns describing what should 
happen under the circumstances that the parties found themselves in. Therefore, Mr. Marmor 
could not possibly have been enforcing any term in the decree. Rather, he was enforcing his 
property rights under Idaho law. Because Mr. Marmor was not enforcing any term of the decree, 
Mr. Marrnor respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the District Court 
awarding fees resulting in two separate judgments against Mr. Marmor. 
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III. THE DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF COSTS WAS NOT 
TIMELY FILED 
Attorney fees incurred in the defense of ancillary matters are waived if not declared within 
14 days after entry of a judgment. "At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the 
court, any party who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a memorandum of costs, 
itemizing each claimed expense, but such memorandum of costs may not be filed later than 
fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment." Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5) (Lexis 
2013). Historically, "a decision" refers to a pronouncement, reduced to writing, signed by the 
Judge and filed with the clerk of the court, detennining the rights of the parties in an action or 
proceedings. Page v. Noland, 85 Idaho 369,373 (1963). 
Judgment means "a separate document entitled' Judgment' or 'Decree'." Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure 54( a) (Lexis 2013). Failure to file a memorandum of costs within the 14-day 
period "shall be a waiver of the right of costs." Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54( d)(5) (Lexis 
2013). However, there is no existing case law that interprets this rule in regards to ancillary 
matters that occur after a court's initial decision. 
In this case, the District Court entered an order deciding this case on March 8, 2013. CR. 
Vol. I, p. 111-112. On that same date, the District Court also entered judgment. CR. Vol. L p. 113-
114. Within 14 days after entry of this judgment, the Respondent filed a memorandum of costs. 
CR. Vol. L p. 115-121. Mr. Mannor timely filed a motion to disallow. CR. Vol. L p. 124-130. In 
response, the District Court entered a Judgment and Order for Attorney Fees and Costs on April 
25, 2013. CR. Vol. L p. 140-141. 
More than 30 days later, the Respondent filed a Supplemental Memorandum For Attorney 
Fees and Costs on June 6, 2013, claiming attorney fees incurred in the defense of the motion to 
disallow. AR. Vol. L Ex. K. On June 12, 2013, Mr. Marmor timely filed a second motion to 
disallow requesting disallowance of the attorney fees incurred in defense of the original motion to 
disallow, among other things. AR. Vol. L Ex.Land M. In deciding this issue, the District Court 
entered another order on October 4, 2013, and entered the resulting judgment on October 16, 
2013. AR. Vol. L Ex. 0 and P. 
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In reaching its decision, the District Court reasoned that a requirement to always file a 
memorandum of costs after each decision and judgment of the court would "undermine the 
efficacy of an initial award of attorney fees." AR. Vol. L Ex. 0, p. 5-6. In giving no supporting 
reasoning, the District Court went on to say that the filing of supplemental memoranda after each 
entry of judgment "would give the non-prevailing party an incentive to continually frustrate the 
prevailing party's attempts to collect its fee because detailed supplemental memoranda would 
almost always be untimely." AR. Vol. L p. Ex 0, p. 6. 
Mr. Maimor's interpretation of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) simply interprets the words of the rule as 
they are written. The party claiming costs may file a memorandum after "a decision of the court" 
and no later than "fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment", or waive their right to costs. As it 
is plainly wtitten, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) does not say that the 14-day limit applies only to the first 
judgment. The rule does not say "THE" decision of the court; the rule applies any time after "A" 
decision of the court. Such an interpretation is correct as to the plain language of the rule, does 
nothing to undennine the efficacy of the initial award, and in no way frustrates any collection 
activity. 
The Judgment and Order for Attorney Fees and Costs filed on Aptil 25, 2013, is a 
judgment under the definition in I.R.C.P 54(a), and it evidences "a decision" of the District Comi 
to award costs, determining the Respondent's right to costs in the proceedings. Therefore, the 
entry of the Judgment and Order for Attorney Fees and Costs on April 25, 2013, triggers the 
LR. C.P. 54( d)( 5) 14-day clock for a memorandum itemizing fees and costs incurred in the 
litigation underlying that judgment. 
As the record shows, the supplemental memorandum was not filed until well after the 14-
day deadline for a supplemental memorandum had expired. Therefore, any right to costs incurred 
as a result of litigation supporting the Aptil 25, 2013 judgment was waived. The supplemental 
memorandum listed such costs from April 11, 2013, to April 26, 2013. Mr. Mam1or respectfully 
requests that the decision of the District Court be reversed and that costs incurred by the 
Respondent between April 11 and April 26 be deemed waived. 
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IV. ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE A WARDED TO THE APPELLANT 
The central issue of this appeal is the attorney fee clause in the divorce decree. Because 
the Respondent wrongly enforced the decree to gain an award of fees from the District Court, this 
appeal now concerns the enforcement of the attorney fee clause. As such, Mr. Marmor is entitled 
to an award of fees pursuant to the decree, because he is defending himself against an 
enforcement of the terms of the decree. 
In addition, Mr. Marmor requests attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, because 
the Respondent's use of the divorce decree lacks merit and foundation both at the District Comi 
and on appeal. There are no te1ms in the decree that were being enforced in the underlying matter 
or in this appeal, and there were other fees awarded for a misinterpretation of I.R.C.P. 54( d)(5). 
As such, attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 are appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Marmor brought the underlying action to enforce property rights. Despite the 
Respondent's contentions, there were no terms in the divorce decree that were being enforced. 
Consequently, the Respondent should never have attempted to use the decree as a mechanism to 
receive and award of attorney fees, and the District Court erred in doing so. The District Court 
also erred in failing to properly apply the language of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) to the circumstances of 
this case and allowed the Respondent to get away with filing a supplemental memorandum of 
costs more than 30 days after entry of judgment. For the reasons stated above, Mr. Marmor 
respectfully requests a reversal of the District Court's awards of fees with costs and fees to the 
prevailing party on appeal. 
Dated: December 16, 2012 Respectfolly Submitted, 
AARON J. TRIBBLE 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_l.&b__ day of December, 2013, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Matthew R. Bohn 
Cosho Humphrey, LLP 
800 Park Blvd. Suite 790 
Boise, ID 83707 
208-338-3290 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
!l .. ~tJ.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid Hand Delivered Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
By•~4~ 
LINDA HIGGINS 
Paralegal for Eagle Law Center 
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